Result Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Ferruzzi Trading USA, Inc., CA2, 56 F.3d 394, 5/25/95 by Christopher M. Walker, Class of 1997
Admiralty Practicum 
Volume 1995 
Issue 1 Fall 1995 Article 9 
February 2018 
Result Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Ferruzzi Trading USA, Inc., CA2, 56 F.3d 
394, 5/25/95 
Christopher M. Walker, Class of 1997 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher M. Walker, Class of 1997 (1995) "Result Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Ferruzzi Trading USA, Inc., CA2, 
56 F.3d 394, 5/25/95," Admiralty Practicum: Vol. 1995 : Iss. 1 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum/vol1995/iss1/9 
This Recent Admiralty Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Admiralty Practicum by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
St. John's University School of Law 
Upon arrival in Texas, some of the cargo 
was damaged. Thyssen and other plain­
tiffs brought an action against the M/V 
Kava Yerakas, Dodekaton and Eurolines 
for cargo damage occurring during tran­
sit. The district court entered judgment in 
favor of vessel owner Dodekaton. The 
other defendants settled and plaintiffs ap­
pealed the judgment in favor of Dodeka­
ton. 
Under COG SA, a cargo owner may only 
recover from the carrier of the goods. Pa­
cific Employers Ins. Co. v. MIV Gloria 
767 F.2d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 1985). A 
"carrier" is "the owner or the charterer 
who enters into a contract of carriage with 
a shipper." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 l (a). A 
"contract of carriage" takes the form of a 
bill of lading or other similar document of 
title. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 l (b). A con­
tract of carriage with a vessel owner may 
be directly between the parties or through 
the charterer's authority to sign bills of 
lading "for the master." Pacific Employ­
ers, 767 F.2d at 236. If, however, the 
charterer signs without the authority of 
the vessel owner, then the owner will not 
be a party to the contract of carriage and 
will not be a "carrier" under COGSA. 
Pacific Employers, 767 F.2d at 237; J. 
Gerber & Co. v. MIV Inagua Tania, 828 
F.Supp. 458, 460 (S.D. Tex. 1 992). To 
establish liability for the vessel owner 
the cargo owner must show that th; 
shipowner was a party to the contract· 
failure to do so will show that the carg� 
owner did not rely on the owner to per­
form the contract. 
The district court did not confront the 
contention that Eurolines, the charterer, 
had power to sign bills of lading on be­
half of Dodekaton based on charter party 
provisions nearly indistinguishable from 
those contained in the Pacific Employers 
case. In Pacific Employers, the fifth cir­
cuit found that charter party provisions 
largely identical to Clause 8 and 45 of the 
Thyssen charter party entitled the char­
terer to sign bills of lading on behalf of 
the vessel owner. Pacific Employers, 767 
Fa111995 
F.2d at 237-38. However, the major de­
parture from the Pacific Employers' 
charter versus that of Thyssen is that the 
latter charter contained an in­
demnification provision, making the 
case more factually similar to a case in 
the fourth circuit, Yeramex Interna­
tional v. S.S. Tendo, 595 F.2d 943 (4th 
Cir. 1 979). The fifth circuit considered 
the Yeramex case in its analysis when 
examining the effect of the indemnity 
clause. 
A provision in a contract of carriaae 
that purports to relieve a party of liabii­
ity is expressly void under the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act. See 46 U.S.C. 
app. § 1 303(8). In the Yeramex case the 
fourth circuit did not allow a much more 
elaborate indemnity provision by itself 
alone to exonerate the vessel owner 
from traditional responsibilities for ves­
sel seaworthiness, etc. The fifth circuit 
circuit agreed with this concept, decid­
ing that the indemnity provision did not 
have a bearing on the owner's liability 
as a COGSA carrier. 
In sum, the fact that the parties had a 
charter party and bill of lading nearly 
identical to those found in Pacific Em­
ployers was controlling. Clause 45 of 
the Thyssen charter party entitled the 
master to allow Eurolines' agent to sign 
the bills of lading, binding the owner. 
If, the court stated, on remand, the ship­
pers proved that the master had actually 
authorized Eurolines to sign on his be­
half, then the Pacific Employers frame­
work would be fulfilled, providing nec­
essary privity with the vessel owner 
thereby meeting the definition of 
COGSA carrier. 
In the absence of this proof, the court 
held that the fifth circuit's standard for 
COGSA liability required privity, re­
jecting arguments by the plaintiffs hold­
ing up second circuit cases where claims 
were directly asserted against vessel 
owners in privity's absence. A better 
argument by Thyssen, which was enter­
tained by the court, was the assertion 
that the district court had erred in find­
ing no common law bailment claim 
against the vessel owner for cargo dam­
age. In the absence of COGSA 
"carriage of goods," which is defined as 
covering "the period from the time 
when the goods are loaded on to the 
time when they are discharged from the 
ship," 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 1 (e), the 
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plaintiffs argued that Dodekaton was li­
able under common law as a bailee of 
cargo for damage caused by its own 
negligence. 
The fifth circuit, however, found that 
plaintiff-appellants had not established 
a prima facie bailment claim against the 
owner. First, plaintiffs did not show 
that an express or implied bailment con­
tract existed. Second, the plaintiffs 
failed to establish that the cargo was 
within Dodekaton's exclusive posses­
sion during transit. (The cargo was also 
within Eurolines'- the charterer's­
possession.) The appeals court af­
firmed the district court, finding that, 
even if a general maritime bailment 
claim were permissible as a matter of 
law, Dodekaton was not liable as a 
bailee for cargo damage. 
William Burkett 
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Supplemental Rules 
SECOND CIRCUIT RULES 
COURTS CAN'T DENY 
COUNTERSECURITY ON 
ARBITRABLE ACTIONS 
While trial courts have broad discre­
tion when ordering countersecurity 
in proceedings brought under Section � of the Arbitration Act, arbitrability 
IS not permissible basis for denying 
countersecurity since the result 
would conflict with clear purposes of 
the Arbitration Act and Supplemen­
tal Fed. R. Civ. P .  E(7). 
(Result Shipping Co. , Ltd. v. Ferruzzi 
Trading USA, Inc. , CA2, 56 F.3d 394, 
5125195) 
Grain was shipped from the United 
States to Jordan pursuant to a contract 
between defendant Ferruzzi Trading 
USA, Inc. (Ferruzzi) and the Jordanian 
Ministry of Supply. Ferruzzi chartered �e MIV Bulk Topaz from Result Ship­
pmg Co., Ltd. (Result) in order to ship 
the grain. The charter party between 
Ferruzzi and Result provided that all 
disputes arising out of the charter would 
be subject to arbitration in London. 
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When the vessel arrived in Jordan, the 
Jordanian Ministry rejected the grain in 
two of the vessel 's holds as damaged and 
seized the MN Bulk Topaz. Result was 
forced to post bond in order to secure the 
vessel "s  release and commenced suit 
against Ferruzzi by attaching Ferruzzi's 
property in the District of Connecticut to 
secure an in personam admiralty claim 
for breach of the charter party. The prop­
erty consisted primarily of a $66,000 
mortgage on residential property owned 
by two Ferruzzi employees. Result 
claimed total damages of $ 1 ,082, 139.30. 
Ferruzzi answered by filing a counter­
claim, alleging that the crew of the MN 
Bulk Topaz was responsible for damaging 
the grain after it had been loaded onto the 
vessel, and that Result was therefore li­
able to Ferruzzi for damages totalling 
$3 75,000. Ferruzzi moved for security 
for its costs in connection with Result's 
attachment of its property, and for coun­
tersecurity on its counterclaim. The dis­
trict court denied both motions and 
granted Result's  motion to stay the pro­
ceedings pending arbitration on the mer­
its in London. 
Ferruzzi appealed the order denying its 
motion for security and countersecurity, 
arguing, inter alia, that the district court 
denied its motion for security and coun­
tersecurity solely because the underlying 
dispute was to be resolved in arbitration. 
Because this case presented "issues 
concerning the interplay of the 
Arbitration Act, * * * and the Supple­
mental Rules governing availability of 
security and countersecurity," Result 
Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Ferruzzi Trading 
USA, Inc., 56 F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 
1 995), which had not been previously 
addressed in the second circuit, the ap­
peals court exercised its jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal under the collateral order 
doctrine. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial 
Loan Corp., 337  U.S. 541 ,  547-47, 69 
S.Ct. 1 221, 1 225, 93 L.Ed. 1 528 ( 1949). 
The issue in the case was whether or not 
the court, in the exercise of its dis­
cretionary power to order countersecu­
rity, could deny such security to a de­
fendant because the action giving rise to 
the counterclaim was subject to contrac-
F al l 1995 
tually stipulated arbitration. 
While acknowledging that the trial 
court has broad discretionary powers 
with respect to ordering countersecurity 
in proceedings brought pursuant to § 8 
of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 8 
( 1 988), the court of appeals held that 
denying countersecurity solely because 
the underlying dispute was to be re­
solved in arbitration would conflict with 
the clear purposes of the Act and Sup­
plemental Rule E(7) of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
Section 8 allows an "aggrieved party" to 
enjoy the advantages of both arbitration 
and traditional maritime security devices, 
and a counterclaiming defendant is an 
"aggrieved party" within the meaning of 
the statute who is as entitled to both these 
remedies as is the plaintiff. • • • [T)he 
purpose of Rule E(7) is to equalize, where 
not otherwise inequitable, the positions of 
the plaintiff and the defendant with re­
spect to security. A plaintiff may not be 
denied an order of attachment merely be­
cause the parties' dispute is to be resolved 
in arbitration.* * • [S)uch arbitration is 
not a permissible basis on which to deny 
the defendant the benefit of traditional 
maritime security devices, such as coun­
tersecurity under Rule E(7). 
56 F.3d at 400. (Emphases in original.) 
Because the record of the proceedings 
in the district court was unclear as to the 
judge's basis for denying Ferruzzi's 
motion for countersecurity, the court of 
appeals remanded "in order to allow the 
District Judge to exercise his discretion 
without reference to the impermissible 
consideration of arbitration." /d. at 401 .  
As to Ferruzzi's motion for security 
for its costs in connection with Result's 
attachment of its property, including le­
gal fees, the court of appeals upheld the 
district court's denial of the motion and 
noted that Ferruzzi had "pointed to no 
federal statute authorizing awards of at­
torney's  fees to a prevailing defendant 
in a maritime case merely because the 
litigation was initiated by attachment." 
/d. In a footnote, the court, relying on 
Incas & Monterey Printing & Packag­
ing, Ltd. v. MIV Sang Jin, 747 F.2d 958, 
965, 965 n. 1 9  (5th Cir. 1 984), cert. de­
nied, 471  U.S. 1 1 1 7, 1 05 S.Ct. 236 1 , 86 
L.Ed.2d 261 ( 1 985), stated further that 
even had Ferruzzi based its counter­
claim on wrongful attachment, counter­
security would not be mandatory under 
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Rule E(7) because the act of the wrong­
ful attachment would not have arisen 
"out of the same transaction or occur­
rence with respect to which the action 
was originally filed." 56 F.3d at 402. 
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BAREBOAT CH ARTERER H ELD 
LIABLE IN SEP ARATE IN 
PERSONAM ACTION ON FACTS 
OF P RIOR IN REM SUIT 
Admiral ty co urts presi ding o ver in 
rem actio ns may award damages i n  
ex cess o f  the val ue o f  the res; b are­
bo at charterer coll aterall y esto pped 
fro m  rel iti gati ng damages and li abil ­
i ty q uestio ns in subseq uent sui t, al­
tho ugh prio r in rem actio n hel d no t 
res judicata o n  separate in personam 
cl aim agai nst charterer. 
(Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Empresa Naviera Santa S. A. , CA2, 
56 F. 3d 359, 5117195) 
On January 1 6, 1988, the MN Luna­
mar II (the Vessel) dragged an anchor 
in the Hudson River, damaging an elec­
trical cable pipeline owned by Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation 
(Central Hudson). The Vessel was op­
erated by Empresa Naviera Santa S.A. 
(Empresa) pursuant to a bareboat char­
ter party. Central Hudson thereafter 
commenced an action in the Southern 
District of New York against the Vessel 
in rem and in personam against the reg­
istered owner, Seiriki One (Panama) 
S.A. (Seiriki). A $3 million letter of un­
dertaking which did not expressly in­
clude any charterparties was delivered 
to Central Hudson by the Vessel's un­
derwriters on behalf of Seiriki. Seiriki 
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